Purpose -Sound corporate governance is now a mainstream issue of concern in the business world. However, there has been no systematic investigation of corporate governance practices in the healthcare sector. Allowing for a distinction between two types of healthcare organizations (profit and non-profit), this paper aims to investigate nuances in the application of sound governance principles across different types of healthcare organizations in the context of a developing country, together with differing understanding and applications of corporate social responsibility.
Introduction
Although interest in sound governance practices may be traced back to the eighteenth century (Farinha, 2003) , corporate governance (CG) has attracted unprecedented attention in the context of modern corporations. The modern corporate form comprises three different entities:
1. shareholders; 2. employees; and 3. managers.
This structure allows space for struggles of power between two key players -managers and shareholders (Grant, 2003) . The importance of CG lies in its role of crafting/continuously refining the laws, regulations and contracts that govern companies' operations, and ensuring that shareholder rights are safeguarded, stakeholder and manager interests are reconciled and that a transparent environment is maintained, wherein each party is able to assume its responsibilities and contribute to the corporation's growth and value creation (Page, 2005) .
Corporate social responsibility (CSR), on the other hand, is concerned with the commitment of business organizations to contribute to sustainable development, stakeholder issues/concerns and improvement of societal conditions Jamali, 2008) . Although an exact definition of CSR remains elusive (Matten and Moon, 2008) , the term is generally used to refer to a mode of business engagement and value creation which fulfills legal, ethical and public societal expectations (Luetkenhorst, 2004) . In simple terms, CSR can be defined as the obligation of a firm to use its resources in ways to benefit society (Snider et al., 2003) . The World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) defines CSR as the commitment of business to contribute to the sustainable economic development of employees, families and the local communities (World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 2001 ). More generally, CSR is a set of policies, practices and programs that are integrated throughout business operations and decision-making processes, and intended to ensure that the company maximizes the positive impacts of its operations on society (Business for Social Responsibility, 2003) .
CG and CSR are closely related as they reflect a firm's commitment to its stakeholders and the nature of its interactions with the community at large . This paper sets out to explore the nature and level of understanding and adherence to CG and CSR best practices within the Lebanese healthcare industry. The healthcare sector has not received systematic attention in discussions of CG and CSR, despite its critical importance worldwide, and the fact that it invariably consists of both profit and non-profit organizations (Eeckloo et al., 2004) . The purpose of the paper is to fill this significant gap in the literature. It draws on in-depth interviews with top hospital executives in the context of an interpretive research methodology. The paper begins with a review of the literature and then outlines the main findings and their implications.
Literature review

CG in healthcare sector
Various definitions of corporate governance are on offer in current business literature. Garvey and Swan (1992) suggest that governance determines how a firm's top decision makers (executives) actually administer and monitor contractual relationships. Scheifer and Vishny (1997) define it as the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. John and Senbet (1998) conceive of CG as comprising mechanisms by which stakeholders of a corporation exercise control over corporate insiders and management, to protect their interests. Cadbury (2000) provides a very simple yet potent definition of CG as ''the system by which companies are directed and controlled'' (Cadbury, 2000, p. 8) .
CG in the healthcare sector has not received systematic attention, although as pointed out by Pointer and Orlikoff (1999) , the challenges facing healthcare delivery organizations today are far greater than in the past. The continuous rise in healthcare costs, expanding market demands, the emergence of new diseases and treatments, technological advancements, public awareness, increasing customer dissatisfaction and media attention are all contributing factors. Demand for improved services, pharmaceuticals and medical breakthroughs on the one hand are counterbalanced by a shrinking pool of investment capital and shortage of willing and qualified caregivers on the other. In a highly competitive consumer market, competition is driving healthcare providers to seek to provide the best care possible, and yet lingering concerns persist regarding the transparency and accountability of these organizations. How public healthcare organizations, in particular, are making use of precious tax revenue is of great concern. Eeckloo et al. (2004) raise the question as to whether, and to what extent, governance models evolved in the corporate world can provide useful comparisons in the field of good hospital governance. They reach the conclusion that, while a simple translation and synthesis of existing practices is likely to be unsatisfactory -particularly in relation to the governance of non-profit hospitals -CG can provide a comprehensive frame of reference to which the hospital sector needs to give its own interpretation. The guiding principle for all these reflections according to the authors should be ''the continuous pursuit of fit between the changing organizational and environmental context and the key configurations of hospital governance, structure, composition and activity of the governing entities'' (Eeckloo et al., 2004, p. 3) .
In this respect, it is important to set a distinction between two different types of healthcare institutions: for-profit and non-profit organizations. Brickley et al. (2003) define the non-profit institution as one whose key governing entities, -for example officers/board members -do not receive the residual profits. Such non-profit organizations benefit from significant tax cuts; however, regulations require that their net surplus be dedicated to social activities. They point out that such organizations have a potential advantage over for-profit organizations because they enjoy lower shareholder conflicts. However, the absence of clear-cut ownership creates a problem in the managerial control mechanism, since managers are not disciplined by their own performance in the market or by interested shareholders. This serves to accentuate, in turn, the role of the board of directors, since free-riding incentives and poor information availability limit the effectiveness of the donor and customer monitoring mechanisms in non-profit organizations.
Other important distinctions between profit and non-profit sectors can be filtered through the literature. Key in this respect is the fact that financial considerations form only one dimension of the mission statement of non-profit hospitals. Another critical variable is the service that a non-profit organization gives its diverse constituencies (McFarlan, 1999) . Eeckloo et al. (2004) similarly point out that non-profit organizations lack the principle of profit maximization, with attention shifting invariably to a wider array of stakeholders. These differences become pronounced in relation to the structures of their respective boards, with non-profit boards tending to be much larger because of the need to represent the many constituencies that have a stake in the organization (McFarlan, 1999) . Non-profit boards are also expected to evaluate how their organizations are achieving the qualitative aspects of their missions (McFarlan, 1999) in terms of enhancing access, quality, social equity, reducing costs and identifying distinctive value-based patient care services (Weil, 2003) .
The most important difference between the two kinds of hospitals may be related to the issue of ultimate ownership and control (Eeckloo et al., 2004) . In the for-profit context, there is invariably a well-defined relationship between ownership and control, generally referred to as the accountability of management and board of directors towards shareholders. Governance of non-profit hospitals is different, however, since there are no real owners, with attention drifting to a wide array of stakeholders (Eeckloo et al., 2004) . This difference has important implications for the decision-making process. In for-profit hospitals all decision-making processes are influenced by one major criterion, which is the best economic interest of the hospital. However, in non-profit hospitals decisions are more complicated, involving the integration and balancing of multiple criteria relating to access, quality, equity, patient care and costs. Notwithstanding such complications, some argue that non-profit boards have adopted sound decision-making processes that are worth emulating by their for-profit counterparts (Drucker, 1989) .
That said, it is important to stress that corporate and non-profit boards also share many similar responsibilities and face many parallel challenges, particularly in today's highly competitive healthcare environment. Common challenges relate to understanding and managing relationships with management and medical staff, interacting with the different drivers and barriers of the business and creating a balance between board authority and management responsibilities. It could be argued that these challenges are more complex for non-profit firms (Wilson, 2002) . Wilson (2002) illustrates this point by highlighting the frequently created tension between a hospital's mission and the need to make a profit. He adds that non-profit board members usually volunteer out of the desire to serve the community, and not to monitor managerial decision-making and performance. This suggests that board members may not be adequately prepared to handle the unrelenting financial pressures that many healthcare organizations have been facing. Table I summarizes the major differences between for-profit and non-profit healthcare organizations in terms of relevant CG dimensions and characteristics.
Further insights into governance practices in healthcare organizations can be gained from considering the related literatures of clinical governance and integrated healthcare. There are close parallels between corporate and clinical governance; clinical governance, however, is mainly focused on what happens in the clinic or hospital, while corporate governance is broader in scope, incorporating clinical governance as one of its most important performance measures. Boards of health institutions that focus on clinical governance are more involved in ''planning and organizing governance structures for safety and quality; and sponsoring a patient focus'' (Braithwaite and Travaglia, 2008, p. 13 ). The board is expected to be more involved in clinical auditing, ensuring access to online evidence, dealing with conflict effectively, managing risk and supporting policies that encourage open disclosure and a patient focused approach (Braithwaite and Travaglia, 2008; Balding, 2005; Duckett, 2007) .
Clinical governance emerged mainly in the UK, Canada and Australia as a reaction to increased litigation pressures, due to a wave of dissatisfaction with the performance of healthcare institutions in the early 1990s (Braithwaite and Travaglia, 2008) . The central objective of a sound clinical governance system is to ensure that the quality and safety of medical services and procedures are the main drivers for healthcare institutions, operations and performance, with a focus on patient outcomes (Braithwaite and Travaglia, 2008; Balding, 2005) . Integrated health systems and health institutions that adopt good clinical governance guidelines are reported to experience a change in culture and systems, enhancing transparency, reporting, accountability and continuous learning and improvement (Braithwaite and Travaglia, 2008; Balding, 2005; Duncan-Marr and Duckett, 2005) . Sound clinical governance also encourages more participation in governance by clinicians and patients (Duckett, 2007) .
Moreover, the integrated healthcare systems literature suggests that healthcare systems across the globe are in a state of flux and transition. Many industrialized countries went through some level of integration in their health systems to eliminate excess capacity in the healthcare industry, improve access to care and reduce costs, resulting in increasingly complicated governance structures (Weil, 2003) . Many governments instituted legislation and incentives to encourage integration. In the USA, the movement toward an integrated system resulted in a wave of mergers and divestures, and many health institutions joined integrated delivery systems (IDS) that often operated across several states. Despite the mixed evidence regarding the success of IDS, it is clear that they did not have a significant impact on quality and costs in any of the countries. This could have been due to political, economic or organizational reasons, such as oligopolistic behavior, coordination and integration issues, or the distance that was created between boards and the local communities (Weil, 2003) .
The lessons that can be drawn from the different experiences in health sector reforms are limited in applicability by the specific country context; nevertheless, there seem to be some general common trends. It is clear that with greater complexity, and, especially, in the absence of a one-dimensional profitability objective and greater pressure for quality and safety, healthcare institutions will have to cater to various stakeholders, and incorporate proper clinical governance as an essential component of sound corporate governance practices. The board composition and role are also becoming more challenging and crucial. According to Meyers (2008) , accountability begins with the chief executive officer (CEO) and boards of directors. They are responsible for setting the tone within healthcare organizations, and ensuring that all the right pieces are in place, from the appropriate equipment and facilities, to qualified clinical staff, and access to hospital resources and services. Boards across profit and non-profit hospitals therefore face a monumental responsibility, in terms of articulating critical mission and goals, instituting checks and balances, reconciling multiple quantitative and qualitative performance criteria and streamlining different configurations of care provision, whilst at the same time promoting transparency and accountability.
In countries such as Lebanon, where most of the organizations are for-profit or non-profit with limited community representation, and where the legal system is under-developed with respect to malpractice, pressures for sound governance might be less accentuated. Adoption of clinical governance is indeed often linked to pressures by the public and external stakeholders. In general, healthcare governance has received very little empirical attention in the literature, particularly in the context of developing countries. The following section deals with an empirical investigation in the context of a developing country (Lebanon), and aims to derive insights relating to healthcare governance that could have wider relevance and applicability.
Methodology
According to the Lebanese Hospital Syndicate web site, the total number of hospitals in Lebanon is 161. They are categorized according to their profit orientation: for-profit, non-profit and governmental hospitals. The methodology adopted is interpretive primary research (Gephart, 2004) , involving in-depth interviews with key healthcare officials, to unearth collective frames of reference, or construed realities that guide the attribution of meaning, and help account for their understanding and applications of various CG and CSR principles.
The use of a common set of questions makes it easier to compare the viewpoints of different interviewees on relevant issues pertaining to CG and CSR practices. Different hospitals were contacted to cover all of the Lebanese territory. Some interview questions gathered factual data while others allowed room for personal reflection and interpretation. In-depth interviews were based on a semi-structured questionnaire that involved both scaled, closed questions that were pre-coded, and some open-ended questions, to gauge interviewee opinions and perspectives on relevant matters. A total of 35 hospitals, covering the whole of Lebanon, were contacted for appointments. Appointments were made with key executives of the 21 hospitals agreeing to take part. Of these, nine interviews performed were with the general director of the hospital or the CEO, the rest being with senior executives who had a thorough knowledge of the hospital and the intricacies of its governance and operations.
Questions were grouped into five sections:
1. general information about the hospital;
2. business structure of the hospital;
3. structure of the board of directors and governance dynamics;
4. accountability to customers, shareholders and stakeholders; and 5. corporate social responsibility.
The hospitals sampled represent those coming under the two identified profit orientations, and are dispersed over all Lebanon. Due to the limited number of hospitals willing to respond, and the nature of the study, the size of a hospital and its operations were not considered as determining factors in the sample selection. It is worth noting that a potential problem of selection bias may arise here, since firms with better governance practices might be more willing than others to respond to the survey and agree to be interviewed (Nam and Nam, 2004) .
Research findings
Demographics
Of for-profit hospitals, 86 percent were family-owned businesses with few owners. On the other hand, 100 percent of non-profit hospitals were of a missionary organization or religious group with boards of directors composed mainly of independent non-paid members (in 83 percent of cases). In 36 percent of for-profit hospitals, the CEO of the hospital was the founder of the hospital, and in 43 percent of these cases the founder was also a family member. On the other hand, in 100 percent of non-profit hospitals the CEO was a manager, not related to the founder, sometimes without a formal managerial degree, but certainly with considerable experience. Amongst all the sampled hospitals 33 percent of CEOs were attending physicians.
Ownership and characteristics
All hospitals surveyed fell into three categories:
1. private for-profit (67 percent);
2. non-profit, which were all a part of a missionary or religious organization (28 percent); and 3. governmental (5 percent).
Within the private category, 36 percent had a CEO who was also the founder, or a member of the founder's family (43 percent), and in each case, a major shareholder. There were no diffuse shareholders in the real sense, or at least not what we might encounter when studying the dynamics of governance in a pure corporate structure. Ownership in family-owned hospitals was usually limited to a few family members. The relevance of good governance in this case did not necessarily relate to the protection of the rights of minority shareholders (because there were none), but rather to protect the interests of other stakeholders, such as employees, patients, doctors, major suppliers, creditors and the community. Our in-depth interviews emphasized these issues, with questions directed to investigate the dynamics of relationships between owners/managers/board members and other stakeholders in the hospitals.
Board structure and effectiveness
The size and composition of the board of directors varied significantly among the different categories identified earlier. Private for-profit hospitals usually had smaller boards (mean of six), with more executives on board (average of three). On the other hand, governmental and non-profit hospitals had fairly large boards (mean of 16), with a majority of independent board members. Seventy-one percent of for-profit hospitals had the chairman acting as CEO. Moreover, he was usually the founder (36 percent) or a family member of the founder (43 percent).
Disclosure and transparency
Only 14 percent of our sample hospitals held annual general assemblies to discuss future strategies in an attempt to involve various stakeholders; however, these meetings were more informative in nature than participative, and decision-making was kept in the hands of those in charge. For-profit hospitals, like other business entities in Lebanon, are mandated by law to present some kind of financial statement to at least one regulatory agency. Our impression is that this is as far as any hospital would go in terms of disclosure of financial data, or any other information related to change in ownership, self-dealing, remuneration of physicians and directors. Non-profit hospitals have no obligation by law to present financial statements to any regulatory agency, since they are exempt from taxes. The only entities that receive and actively review the financial statements of non-profit hospitals are their own boards of directors; this was prevalent in 83 percent of the non-profit hospitals taking part.
Independent board members
In 52 percent of our sample hospitals, there were no independent board members on the board of directors. In all for-profit hospitals that were interviewed, none satisfied the recommendation of the Equity Advisory Group (EAG) task force in Lebanon (Institute for International Finance, 2005) which suggests that at least one third of the board comprises outside members, with the majority of those as independent board members. By contrast, the board members of non-profit hospitals were largely independent. However, none of the independent board members was elected. In for-profit hospitals, the controlling owner selected independent board members by appointment. In non-profit hospitals, all independent board members were appointed by a higher committee, or a supreme council.
Function of the board of directors
All the boards of directors in our sample hospitals scored highly in terms of level of involvement in the different governance activities and tasks that fall under their job description. Table II illustrates the level of involvement of the board of directors in different tasks and activities on a pre-assigned scale. It should be noted that non-profit hospital boards are involved in both financial auditing and internal auditing. When an audit committee exists, it is usually well structured and governed by policies and procedures. All audit committees included a member with accounting/financial expertise and an adequate background in hospital transactions. These audit committees were present in about half of all hospitals sampled. However, none of these committees, or their chairpersons, were given the autonomy of choosing the external auditor, who assumes an important function in all hospitals.
External auditors' contracts with the hospitals also varied. Some external auditors were appointed by the controlling owner, and others were agreed upon after a bid. In for-profit hospitals, the external auditor was appointed directly by the board in 80 percent of cases. In non-profit hospitals, 33 percent of external auditors were appointed; the rest were selected after a bid was conducted. Table III highlights information obtained with respect to main audit committee functions across for-profit and non-profit healthcare firms.
Evaluation and compensation of the CEO
Performance appraisal was a common practice in most of the hospitals, but was normally used for staff, and not for executives or board members. Recently, a new performance appraisal scheme has been introduced for executives and the CEO, but not for board members (Ammar et al., 2007) . In several incidents in the for-profit family owned hospitals, the CEO/major shareholder filled out his own evaluation.
Accountability to shareholders and stakeholders Table IV illustrates the level of involvement of the different hospitals in matters related to accountability towards various stakeholders. For-profit private hospitals almost never disciplined or removed a CEO, mainly because the CEO is usually a major shareholder, if not an owner. Non-profit hospitals had a higher incidence of replacing or disciplining the CEO. The medical director of a non-profit hospital commented that:
Financial criteria among other factors have been a determining cause of replacing several of our CEOs in the past 5 years. Whether we like it or not, we have to survive the market in order to Neither for-profit nor non-profit hospitals accorded systematic attention to the needs of external stakeholders. This is reflected in the pattern of answers obtained in relation to attitudes and actions vis-à -vis the government and local community. There was, however, a slightly more positive propensity detected on the part of non-profit hospitals towards both the community and government stakeholder. This reflects an openness towards different stakeholders and an inclination for effective engagement with CSR. However neither type of hospital seemed to appreciate their important social role in the context of the local communities in which they operate.
Social responsibility
In terms of CSR, all the hospitals interviewed shared modest accounts and overtures. The motivation for social responsibility seemed to stem from the preference of the owners in family-owned hospitals, the mission and goals of the missionary organizations, the religious beliefs and nature of the Lebanese community, and the poor status of medical services offered to citizens. All the hospitals agreed that they would perform a life-saving procedure for any patient in a critical situation, even if this might cause them financial loss. Non-profit hospitals encounter such cases every day, and appear to accept them more readily, as this is part of their mission. However, most hospitals scored low on the level of contribution to societal work and degree of involvement in preventive medicine, awareness campaigns, free screening and free vaccinations. governance practices: none of the CEOs in the sampled non-profit hospitals acted as the respective board chairman -in line with best practice. Moreover, boards of non-profit hospitals were larger, with a smaller percentage of executive members on the board, again in accord with best practice. Non-profit hospital boards housed more independent members than their for-profit counterparts, in line with the recommendations for good governance. In contrast, for-profit hospitals lacked these attributes. However, it is important to remember the nature of the family ownership of the majority of for-profit hospitals in the sample (86 percent), which might explain the deviation from best CG practices. Non-profit hospitals also exhibited a better, more positive inclination towards external stakeholders, including needy patients, the government and the local community.
Discussion of findings
The main findings in this paper reinforce the evidence on differences in governance between for-profit and non-profit institutions in general. For-profit health institutions in Lebanon have smaller boards, which potentially makes them more effective (Larson, 2005) . However, these boards are composed mainly of insiders, which may translate into conflicts of interest and does not set a good example for accountability and performance evaluation. The monitoring role of the board becomes ineffective, and this is reflected in the responses regarding selecting, monitoring and disciplining the CEO/senior executives and physicians (Tables II  and III) . Even though all the for-profit boards cited integrity of financial statement as one of their main functions (Table II) , the selection of the external auditor, and the absence of an audit committee in most cases raises doubts as to the effectiveness of the process. Non-profit boards score higher in terms of monitoring the CEO, the existence of an audit committee and the external auditor selection process.
There are also clear differences with regard to communicating with the local society, wherein for-profit institutions score much lower with respect to disclosing information and communicating with the various stakeholders (Tables II and V) . This may suggest that for-profit institutions do not consider that they are accountable to the community. Neither for-profit nor non-profit hospitals have direct community or stakeholder representatives on their boards. This is particularly significant for non-profit institutions, where financial consideration is only one of many concerns in decision-making, and where the institution serves a diverse constituency. The community may have a direct stake here, in terms of monitoring access, quality, social equity, and costs, and confirming the existence of distinctive value-based patient care services.
On the other hand, there is more involvement of for-profit boards in hospital operations, the medical department and patient/physician conflict. This could be explained by the fact that the CEO is often the chair of the board and possesses the necessary medical expertise and operational knowledge. This highlights the potential advantage of having insiders on the board (Larson, 2005) . In addition, for-profit family-owned and run hospitals might benefit from an integrated organizational structure, due to the small size factor and the CEO often being a member of the medical team as well as chair of the board. This might lead to a higher quality in services and efficiency improvements (Eeckloo et al., 2004) . These insiders might also play a more effective role in understanding and impacting clinical governance.
Both for-profit and non-profit hospitals in Lebanon seem to be running risks. For-profit institutions should move towards a more independent board and a direct representation of the medical professionals, coupled with an attention to risk management and patient concerns. Non-profit hospitals need to involve more direct stakeholder and community representation, and include board members with the medical expertise and knowledge required to lead and monitor a clinical governance initiative. The challenge remains for boards across both sectors to oversee a real change in culture to ensure proper clinical governance. The qualifications and independence of the board are crucial, but transparency, accountability, assessment and a thorough review of reporting procedures and appropriate follow-up are equally necessary.
Concluding remarks
An overview of the main observations and results indicates that Lebanese hospitals have some way to go in order to promote or enact a governance system that would comply with recommendations of best governance practices. There is no transparency in a real sense, and little protection of minority shareholders -or any of the stakeholders, for that matter. There is no real separation between ownership and control, or between control and supervision. Even those hospitals which presented better governance structures sometimes lacked the spirit of better governance or missed out on the details that would ensure objectivity and accountability on different levels. One of the main reasons why they lack good governance is that good corporate governance practices are still merely recommendations, and are not prioritized or assessed seriously in developing country contexts.
However, one should not ignore the nature of the Lebanese hospital sector, and the fact that it is far from being mainstream in corporate transactions, simply because the size of daily business is negligible in comparison to the healthcare business of well-developed financial markets. The trajectory for governance will depend on issues of ownership, expansion, market development and competitive initiatives. Although it is better to have general guidelines for a broad and comprehensive sound governance practice, some details should be kept hospital-specific, at least for the foreseeable future, and ownership and control should not undergo radical changes. The real driver for better governance should stem from the belief of hospital decision-makers that better governance would boost the performance of even family-owned hospitals, simply because better governance would help reduce costs and optimize operations, not to mention the favorable effect it would have on brand name and reputation in a fierce consumer-oriented market.
It is vital that the approach to better governance should not be crippling to a business, but should rather play a supportive role. Further research will help fine-tune the best practices for the hospital governance system. Last but not least, it is crucial that any introduced governance system revives in its value and recommendations the humanistic purpose of healthcare delivery, and draws a red line under ethical issues and social values that should never be lost in the quest for economic profits. In today's world, all businesses are expected to contribute in one way or another to society. Simply to be a non-profit organization is not enough for a non-profit hospital to be considered as fulfilling a social role, nor is it enough to be responsible in a reactive way. Hospitals should be proactive role models, focusing on increasing awareness, promoting prevention, and holding community events relevant to medical issues.
At a time when the quality and safety outcomes of health institutions are in the spotlight, and given the sensitive nature of services provided in this sector, calls for better governance and increased responsibility are unlikely to wane. Just the opposite: we expect more scrutiny and escalating expectations to which all healthcare institutions (profit and non-profit making) will have to attend, in both developed and developing countries. The principles of corporate governance and corporate social responsibility developed in the corporate world do indeed provide a comprehensive frame of reference, to which the hospital sector needs to give its own interpretation. Accountability, transparency, and responsibility are clearly the hallmarks of this system, the board of directors being the key engine or agent of change. As stated succinctly by Braithwaite and Travaglia (2008, p. 19) , ''at the end of the day, this is about working toward clinical and organizational excellence. No board or executive group should want to settle for anything less''.
